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I. INTRODUCTION
Henry Montgomery was a seventeen-year-old from the segregated town of 
Scotlandville, just outside of Baton Rouge, Louisiana in 1963.1 He was skipping 
school on November 13, 1963 when stopped by East Baton Rouge Sherriff’s
Deputy Charles Hurt.2 During the stop, Montgomery—a “slow learner” with an 
IQ in the low seventies—became fearful and struck Deputy Hurt with a single 
shot from a .22 caliber pistol.3 In the days following the shooting, over 300 law 
enforcement personnel from surrounding jurisdictions descended on 
Scotlandville to apprehend suspects and administer extrajudicial beatings.4
Montgomery was tried and convicted of Hurt’s murder and sentenced to a life 
term without the possibility of parole.5 In subsequent decades, juveniles who 
committed similar crimes that shocked the public conscience became known as 
“super-predators” prone to impulsive violence with no concept of the future.6
This stereotype created a national demand for tougher sentencing laws for 
juveniles, often carrying heavily racialized implications.7
This Note argues that the Eighth Amendment guarantees a parole hearing 
for juveniles after twenty-five years of incarceration as part of its jurisprudence 
on juvenile life without parole sentences. The Eighth Amendment’s prohibition 
of cruel and unusual punishment guarantees individuals the right not to be 
subjected to excessive sanctions.8 While the U.S. Supreme Court continues to 
allow life without parole sentences for the rare juveniles who are deemed 
                                                                                                                     
* Law student at The Ohio State University Moritz College of Law and Editor in Chief 
of The Ohio State Law Journal for the 2018-2019 academic year. The author would like to 
thank every member of The Ohio State Law Journal for their tireless work, especially Emily 
Bowen and Maggie O’Shea.
1 Katy Reckdahl, Man Jailed 50 Years for Murder Is at Center of Supreme Court 
Hearing on Youth Life Sentences, JUV. JUST. INFO. EXCHANGE (Oct. 11, 2015),
https://jjie.org/2015/10/11/henry-montgomery-imprisoned-for-50-years-for-killing-a-
deputy-is-at-center-of-supreme-court-hearing-on-youth-life-sentences/ [https://perma.cc/4N
2R-9F66]; Grace Toohey, Board Denies Parole to Man Who Served More Than 50 Years 
After Killing Deputy When He Was Juvenile, THE ADVOCATE (Feb. 19, 2018), 
www.theadvocate.com/baton_rouge/news/courts/article_acca953e-1579-11e8-aa66-1b036f
45b902.html [https://perma.cc/GD2N-KZB5].




6 See Kevin Drum, A Very Brief History of Super-Predators, MOTHERJONES (Mar. 3, 
2016), https://www.motherjones.com/kevin-drum/2016/03/very-brief-history-super-
predators/ [https://perma.cc/7M7U-B5X2] (describing the racialized impact of sentencing 
trends from the 1970s to the present). 
7 Id.
8 “Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and 
unusual punishments inflicted.” U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.
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“irreparab[ly] corrupt[ed]” or permanently incorrigible,9 the Court has not 
required states to implement specific measures to protect the Eighth 
Amendment rights of juvenile defendants, even after applying its juvenile life 
without parole jurisprudence retroactive to previous sentences as a substantive 
right.10 In response, some states have banned juvenile life without parole by 
statute or found it unconstitutional in state court. With these actions, states often 
point to discoveries in the field of juvenile brain science11 and the corresponding 
Supreme Court jurisprudence based on “the evolving standards of decency that 
mark the progress of a maturing society.”12
Despite the Court’s holdings, other states have displayed a vigorous 
insistence on sentencing juveniles to life terms or consecutive terms that 
aggregate into a functional life sentence.13 As a result, the procedural 
requirements for state constitutional compliance are unclear, creating an uneven 
application of the Eighth Amendment and jeopardizing the substance of its 
protections for juveniles.14 Without more guidance, states will continue to 
diverge until the constitutional protections the Supreme Court intended for 
juveniles beginning with Graham v. Florida15 are an ineffective safeguard 
against long and disproportionate terms, even after Miller v. Alabama16 and
Montgomery v. Louisiana.17
This Note examines the arc of U.S. Supreme Court jurisprudence on 
juvenile criminal sentencing and concludes that the Court must require a parole 
hearing for juveniles after twenty-five years of incarceration. Part II discusses 
the evolution of the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence on juvenile criminal 
sentencing, from its prohibition on juvenile executions in Roper v. Simmons to 
its ban on juvenile life without parole sentences for non-homicide offenses in 
Graham. Part III describes the disparate approaches among the states based on 
the linguistic gaps in the Court’s rulings in Graham, Miller, and Montgomery.
Part IV describes the injustice of inconsistency these linguistic gaps continues 
to create for juveniles, depending on the state in which the crime was committed.
                                                                                                                     
9 See Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460, 479–80 (2012) (quoting Roper v. Simmons, 
543 U.S. 551, 573 (2005); Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 63 (2010)).
10 See Montgomery v. Louisiana, 136 S. Ct. 718, 736 (2016).
11 See Josh Rovner, Juvenile Life Without Parole: An Overview, SENT’G PROJECT (Oct. 
13, 2017), http://www.sentencingproject.org/publications/juvenile-life-without-parole/ 
[https://perma.cc/L68Z-NKZH].
12 Roper, 543 U.S. at 561; see also State v. Bassett, 428 P.3d 343 (Wash. 2018) (holding 
juvenile life without parole sentences to be unconstitutional).
13 See Rovner, supra note 11, at 3 (“Thirty states still allow life without parole as 
sentencing option for juveniles.”).
14 See infra Parts IV.V. A–C.
15 Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 82 (2010) (imposing a categorical ban on juvenile 
life without parole for non-homicide offenses).
        16 Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460, 479–80 (2012) (prohibiting a sentence of life 
without parole absent a finding of permanent incorrigibility).
        17 Montgomery v. Louisiana, 136 S. Ct. 718, 736 (2016) (holding Miller applies 
retroactively to juveniles sentenced prior to 2012). 
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Due to tough on crime politics and the confines of federalism, Part V argues 
states are incapable of remedying the inconsistencies in juvenile sentencing law 
without intervention from the Court directing parole hearings for juveniles after 
twenty-five years. Part VI briefly concludes by advocating for progress that 
allows juveniles hope for redemption without compromising public safety.
II. OVERVIEW OF ROPER, GRAHAM, MILLER, AND MONTGOMERY
The U.S. Supreme Court’s gradual imposition of bright-line rules against 
the death penalty and mandatory life without parole for juveniles places the 
sentencing practices of many states into question. Roper’s categorical ban on 
the death penalty for juveniles is supported by the absence of penological 
justifications for such a sentence due to the diminished culpability of all 
juveniles.18 Graham’s ban on juvenile life without parole sentences for non-
homicide crimes expanded on Roper’s reasoning by deeming juveniles who do 
not kill to be half as culpable as adults who kill.19 Miller held the imposition of 
mandatory life without parole sentences on juveniles to be unconstitutional.20
Subsequently, the Court determined Miller’s holding applies retroactively to all 
juveniles in Montgomery, giving thousands the potential to have a meaningful 
opportunity to obtain release.21
A. How Roper Applies to All Juveniles
In abolishing the death penalty for juveniles in all cases, the Supreme Court 
grounded its reasoning in language that presumably applies to all juvenile 
criminal defendants. First, the Court stated, “Once the diminished culpability of 
juveniles is recognized, it is evident that the penological justifications for the 
death penalty apply to them with lesser force than to adults.”22 In applying the 
protections of the Eighth Amendment to juveniles, the Court is unequivocal in 
its statement that the penological justifications of retribution and deterrence are 
less applicable to juveniles because of their diminished capacity.23 Importantly, 
the Court notes the professional consensus among psychiatrists precluding 
certain personality diagnoses during adolescence, whether the juvenile is a 
criminal defendant or not.24
                                                                                                                     
18 Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 571 (2005).
19 Graham, 560 U.S. at 69.
20 Miller, 567 U.S. at 489.
21 Montgomery, 136 S. Ct. at 736.
22 Roper, 543 U.S. at 571.
23 Id. at 571–72. 
24 Id. at 573. Psychiatrists are forbidden from “diagnosing any patient under 18 as 
having antisocial personality disorder, a disorder also referred to as psychopathy or 
sociopathy, and which is characterized by callousness, cynicism, and contempt for the 
feelings, rights, and suffering of others.” Id. (citing AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N, DIAGNOSTIC 
AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL DISORDERS 701–706 (4th ed. text, rev. 2000)).
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B. The Graham Gap
An analysis of Graham should begin with the Court’s notation that life 
without parole is an especially harsh sentence for juveniles that “forswears 
altogether the rehabilitative ideal.”25 In banning juvenile life without parole 
sentences for non-homicide offenses in Graham, the Court submitted that “when 
compared to an adult murderer, a juvenile offender who did not kill or intend to 
kill has a twice diminished moral culpability.”26 Graham was also the Court’s
first acknowledgment that the United States is the only country on Earth that 
imposes juvenile life without parole sentences for any offense.27 Most 
significantly, the Court’s opinion in Graham recognizes the unacceptable risk 
of an erroneous conclusion about the incorrigibility of a juvenile and the 
importance of granting the offender to an opportunity “demonstrate maturity 
and reform” with a categorical rule.28 The Court recognized life without parole 
as “the second most severe penalty permitted by law” and the most severe 
punishment available to juvenile defendants after Roper.29 The Court is also 
direct in its assertion that “[l]ife without parole is an especially harsh 
punishment for a juvenile.”30
Despite the apparent strength of the Court’s bright–line rule, the 
conservative justices seized on the limits of the majority opinion in Graham,
noting that the holding does not expressly prevent juveniles from being 
sentenced to long periods of incarceration defined by a term of years.31 This 
limitation is an inference from the language of the majority opinion and states 
have seized on this dissenting language to circumvent the obligations of 
Graham.32 The decision has led to litigation and legislative activity across the 
country attempting to clarify the boundaries of the Court’s opinion.33
                                                                                                                     
25 Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 74 (2010).
26 Id. at 69.
27 Id. at 81.
28 Id. at 78–79. 
29 Id. at 69 (quoting Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 1001 (1991)). The Court 
elaborates on the relative severity of life without parole sentences, noting “life without parole 
sentences share some characteristics with death sentences that are shared by no other 
sentences.” Id. at 69. Though “[a] death sentence is unique in its severity and irrevocability,”
a life without parole is like the death penalty in that “[i]t deprives the convict of the most 
basic liberties without giving hope of restoration.” Id. at 69–70. 
30 Id. at 70. “Under this sentence a juvenile offender will on average serve more years 
and a greater percentage of his life in prison than an adult offender. A 16-year-old and a 75-
year-old each sentenced to life without parole receive the same punishment in name 
only . . . This reality cannot be ignored.” Id. at 70–71.
31 Graham, 560 U.S. at 113 n.11 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (“[I]t seems odd that the 
[Supreme] Court counts only those juveniles sentenced to life without parole and excludes 
from its analysis all juveniles sentenced to lengthy term-of-years sentences (e.g., 70 or 80 
years’ imprisonment).”); Id. at 124 (Alito, J., dissenting) (“Nothing in the Court’s opinion 
affects the imposition of a sentence to a term of years without the possibility of parole.”).
32 See infra Part I.V.A–C.
33 Id.
996 OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 79:5
C. Miller and Montgomery’s Ban on Mandatory Juvenile Life Without 
Parole
Miller is an affirmation from the majority of the Supreme Court that juvenile 
life sentences should be treated as analogous to capital punishment for adults.34
In abolishing mandatory life without parole for juveniles, the Court borrowed 
language from Graham to assert that such mandatory sentencing schemes 
prevent an individualized sentencing decision for each juvenile and thus violate 
the Eighth Amendment’s principle of proportionality.35 An individualized 
sentencing hearing is guaranteed for juveniles and such procedural protections 
exist for those facing the most severe punishment a court can impose.36 The 
Court has used similar individualized sentencing principles in its adult death 
penalty jurisprudence to prevent the random imposition of the ultimate 
punishment and impose procedural discipline on the states.37
The Montgomery Court expanded on the Miller holding by announcing that 
an individualized sentencing determination is a substantive right under the 
Eighth Amendment and applies retroactively to juveniles previously sentenced 
to life without parole.38 The decision imposed new obligations on dozens of 
states and impacted hundreds with defined life without parole sentences handed 
down prior to the Miller decision.39 Despite the Court’s assertion that there is a 
developing “national consensus” against the imposition of juvenile life without 
parole,40 the Eighth Amendment’s limits on juvenile sentencing are still 
amorphous after Montgomery.41
                                                                                                                     
34 Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460, 474 (2012) (“Graham makes plain these mandatory 
schemes’ defects in another way: by likening life-without-parole sentences imposed on 
juveniles to the death penalty itself. Life-without-parole terms, the Court wrote, ‘share some 
characteristics with death sentences that are shared by no other sentences.’” (quoting 
Graham, 560 U.S. at 69)).
35 Id. at 489.
36 See, e.g., Sumner v. Sherman, 483 U.S. 66, 85 (1987) (abolishing mandatory death 
penalty statutes devoid of individualized sentencing considerations).
37 See id. (“[A]ny legitimate state interests can be satisfied fully through the use of a
guided-discretion statute that ensures adherence to the constitutional mandate of heightened
reliability in death-penalty determinations through individualized-sentencing procedures.”).
38 Montgomery v. Louisiana, 136 S. Ct. 718, 733–736 (2016).
39 Matt Ford, A Retroactive Break for Juvenile Offenders, THE ATLANTIC (Jan. 26,
2016), https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2016/01/montgomery-alabama-
supreme-court/426897/ [https://perma.cc/DS7N-5LW8].
40 Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 62 (2010).
41 Id. at 82. 
The Constitution prohibits the imposition of a life without parole sentence on a juvenile 
offender who did not commit homicide. A State need not guarantee the offender 
eventual release, but if it imposes a sentence of life it must provide him or her with 
some realistic opportunity to obtain release before the end of that term.
Id.
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D. Are There Still Juvenile Lifers After Miller and Montgomery?
Following Miller and Montgomery, some commentators expressed a 
cautious optimism that legislative action in states would institute safeguards to 
prevent the overuse of juvenile life without parole sentences.42 However, 
despite the Supreme Court’s rulings, nearly 10,000 juveniles still have juvenile 
life without parole or virtual life sentences.43 Justice Sotomayor’s opinion in 
Tatum v. Arizona seems to imply the Court will require a forward-looking
approach to declare a juvenile permanently incorrigible, as opposed to a 
backward-looking inquiry focusing on the facts of the criminal misdeed.44
III. DISPARATE APPROACHES AMONG THE STATES AFTER GRAHAM,
MILLER, AND MONTGOMERY
The uncertainty in the law after Miller and Montgomery has led states to 
explore an array of options.45 Professors Doriane Lambelet Coleman and James 
E. Coleman, Jr., described this array of options as “legislative choices.”46While 
                                                                                                                     
42 See, e.g., Doriane Lambelet Coleman & James E. Coleman, Jr., Getting Juvenile Life 
Without Parole “Right” After Miller v. Alabama, 8 DUKE J. CONST. L. & PUB. POL’Y 61, 68–
69 (2012) (“[B]ecause our goal in this essay is to offer suggestions for how states might 
implement Miller responsibly, we proceed on the basis it is possible at least to get [juvenile 
life without parole] more right than not, and that there are approaches that might be effective 
to minimize the risk of error.”).
43 Matt Ford, The Reckoning over Young Prisoners Serving Life Without Parole, THE
ATLANTIC (July 14, 2017), https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2017/07/juvenile-
life-without-parole/533157/ [https://perma.cc3YJV-RUCD].
[M]ore than 200,000 people are serving either life in prison or a “virtual” life sentence: 
They haven’t been explicitly sentenced to spend their natural lives behind bars, but their 
prison terms extend beyond a typical human lifespan. Of these prisoners, thousands 
were sentenced as juveniles. More than 2,300 are serving life without parole, often 
abbreviated LWOP, and another 7,300 have virtual life sentences. Only after they serve 
decades in prison do members of the latter group typically become eligible for parole. 
Id.
44 Tatum v. Arizona, 137 S. Ct. 11, 12 (2016) (Sotomayor, J., concurring).
It is clear after Montgomery that the Eighth Amendment requires more than mere 
consideration of a juvenile offender’s age before the imposition of a sentence of life 
without parole. It requires that a sentencer decide whether the juvenile offender before 
it is a child “whose crimes reflect transient immaturity” or is one of “those rare children 
whose crimes reflect irreparable corruption” for whom a life without parole sentence 
may be appropriate. There is thus a very meaningful task for the lower courts to carry 
out on remand. 
Id. at 13.
45 See infra Part IV.
46 Coleman & Coleman, supra note 42, at 69–75 (describing the “The Legislative 
Choice to End JLWOP,” “The Legislative Choice to Delay the Parole Decision,” and “The 
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Coleman & Coleman argue the Court should have announced a categorical rule 
barring juvenile life without parole in Miller,47 they also seek to accommodate 
the public’s interest in permanently excluding a juvenile offender from society 
in rare cases.48 This framework for understanding the Court’s juvenile 
sentencing jurisprudence has created several different approaches in the states 
and a patchwork of sentencing schemes has followed.49
An Associated Press investigation of outcomes for juveniles with life 
without parole sentences in 2017 revealed “very different brands of justice from 
place to place.”50 Many states have struggled to implement reforms consistent 
with the spirit of the Court’s juvenile sentencing jurisprudence,51 creating a 
wanton and freakish penalty that “smacks of … a lottery system.”52 The
disparate reactions of the states is indicative of the unconstitutional nature of the 
penalty itself.53
                                                                                                                     
Legislative Choice to Permit the Sentence of JLWOP According to Strict Procedural 
Safeguards”).
47 Id. at 62. “Imposing terminal punishments on children is negligent because it allows 
the responsible adults and the state as ‘back-up parent’ to abandon their childrearing and 
child protection obligations with impunity, and (relatedly) because it assumes that we can 
know without ever trying that a child cannot be rehabilitated.” Id. at 64. 
Imposing such a terminal punishment on children is also cruel (in the common if not 
also the legal sense of this term) because the judgment, at the time it is made, can never 
be based on evidence “beyond reasonable doubt,” which we should require for the 
extraordinary decision to ‘throw away’ a child. 
Id. at 65.
48 Id. at 67–68 (“[T]he public is understandably afraid of and has an interest in 
permanently incapacitating true psychopaths as well as others whose environments have so 
deeply and permanently damaged them that they are, in effect, the equivalent of 
psychopaths.”); see also Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 598–603 (2005) (O’Connor, J., 
dissenting) (exploring when defendants are sufficiently depraved to merit the death penalty).
49 See infra Part IV.
50 Sharon Cohen & Adam Geller, AP Exclusive: Parole for Young Lifers Inconsistent 
Across U.S., ASSOCIATED PRESS (July 31, 2017), https://www.apnews.com/a592b421f7604
e2b88a170b5b438235f [https://perma.ccVR84-F6M2]. 
51 See infra Parts IV, V.A–C.
52 Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 239–40 (1972) (overruling the imposition of three 
death sentences on Eighth Amendment grounds). Justice Stewart described the 
administration of death sentences as unconstitutionally “cruel and unusual in the same way 
that being struck by lightning is cruel and unusual.” Id. at 309 (Stewart, J., concurring). 
Justice Brennan concluded a death sentence is unconstitutional when “inflicted arbitrarily”
so as to resemble a “lottery system.” Id. at 293 (Brennan, J., concurring). Justice Douglas 
had a different explanation for the selective administration of the death penalty, calling the 
discretionary statutes authorizing the sentences “unconstitutional in their operation” and 
“pregnant with discrimination.” Id. at 256–57 (Douglas, J., concurring).
53 See infra Part V.
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A. Ban Juvenile Life Without Parole
Today, twenty states and the District of Columbia ban juvenile life without 
parole as a sentencing option, and five more states ban the sentence in most 
cases.54 Passage of more reforms could lead the Supreme Court to recognize a 
new developing “national consensus”55 against the practice of juvenile life 
without parole, but such a standard has been criticized as giving too much 
deference to state legislatures.56 In addition, juvenile life without parole remains 
undefined, limiting the scope of the rule in Graham.57 It appears the Court will 
have to step in and define the limits Graham imposes on functional juvenile life 
without parole with more specificity in the future.
B. Grant Juvenile Life Without Parole Prisoners a Resentencing 
Hearing
After the Court’s Montgomery decision, states are required to resentence 
juveniles originally sentenced to life without parole to a non-life sentence or 
give them a parole hearing.58 However, the Court did not define resentencing 
procedures for compliance with Montgomery’s holding.59 Thus, confusion 
reigns about the states’ obligations upon resentencing a juvenile with a life 
without parole sentence.60 For states with hundreds of juveniles sentenced to life 
without parole, resentencing has become a large burden after Miller and 
Montgomery.61 The process is expensive for underfunded state and local 
                                                                                                                     
54 States That Ban Life Without Parole for Children, CAMPAIGN FOR THE FAIR 
SENTENCING OF YOUTH (2018), https://www.fairsentencingofyouth.org/media-resources/
states-that-ban-life/  [https://perma.cc/9GF2-7H6X].
55 See Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 62 (2010). 
56 Kevin White, The Constitutional Limits of the “National Consensus” Doctrine in 
Eighth Amendment Jurisprudence, 2012 BYU L. REV. 1371, 1374 (2012) (“[A] national 
consensus-only approach would grant legislatures an impermissibly broad power to define 
the contours of the Constitution. More specifically, a national consensus-only approach 
would essentially undermine the policies that gave rise to adoption of the Eighth 
Amendment.”). The Court has explicitly recognized the limits of the state legislatures’ ability 
to interpret the Eighth Amendment, stating “community consensus, while ‘entitled to great 
weight,’ is not itself determinative of whether a punishment is cruel and unusual.” Graham,
560 U.S. at 67 (quoting Kennedy v. Louisiana, 554 U.S. 407, 434 (2008)).
57 See infra Parts IV, V.
58 “A State may remedy a Miller violation by permitting juvenile homicide offenders 
to be considered for parole, rather than by resentencing them.” Montgomery v. Louisiana,
136 S. Ct. 718, 744 (2015) (internal citation omitted).
59 See infra Part VI.
60 See Montgomery, 136 S. Ct. at 736 (2016).
61 See, e.g., Bryn Stole, With New Law on the Books, Louisiana Courts Prepare to 
Resentence Hundreds of Juvenile Murders, THE ADVOCATE (July 23, 2017), 
http://www.theadvocate.com/baton_rouge/news/courts/article_dc5ae4c2-6f28-11e7-9633-
2bee1fbaf113.html [https://perma.cc/9x66-M3AC] (describing the volume of resentencing 
cases required in Louisiana after Montgomery).
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government agencies.62 For prosecutors and defense attorneys working on 
resentencing cases, at least some evidence has been lost forever.63 In older cases, 
a strong possibility exists that witnesses and relatives will be dead or impossible 
to locate.64 Most troublingly for resentencing after Montgomery, the cost of 
obtaining the basic mitigating evidence necessary to formulate a case to support 
a non-life sentence is often prohibitive for public defense agencies.65 Defense 
attorneys also fear prosecutors will be able to effectively price them out of 
obtaining mitigating evidence by seeking life without parole sentences again at 
every resentencing.66 As a practical matter, the expense of assembling the 
evidence necessary for resentencing threatens the constitutional guarantees 
embedded within the Court’s jurisprudence.
C. Institute Procedural Safeguards at Sentencing
States wishing to maintain juvenile life without parole as a punishment after 
Miller are required to develop sentencing findings that support the imposition 
of that punishment. States, including Arizona, continued to sentence new 
juvenile defendants to life without parole after Miller and Montgomery.67 The 
Court rebuked some of these sentences in Tatum v. Arizona, but did not issue a 
ruling with the force of a majority opinion that defines compliance procedures 
supporting sentencing findings that would allow a juvenile life without parole 
sentence.68 Pennsylvania requires the sentencing court to find that the juvenile 
defendant is permanently incorrigible beyond a reasonable doubt to impose a 
juvenile life without parole sentence.69 Many other states have struggled to 
define a coherent framework that meets the Supreme Court’s standard for a
                                                                                                                     
62 Id. (estimating the expense for public defenders to be $50,000 to $75,000 per case).
63 Id. (“In south Louisiana, where destructive hurricanes have washed away documents 
and scattered families, chasing down foster care records or former neighbors can be a 
daunting and time-consuming enterprise.”).
64 Id. (describing the difficulty of finding relatives of all those involved in old cases). 
Attorneys have turned to old newspaper obituaries and online databases to track down people 
affected by these cases. Id.
65 Id. Defendant Dexter Allen’s attorney had no money to pay for mental health experts 
and “an investigator who volunteered to work for free couldn’t track down all of [Allen’s] 
school records.” Id.
66 Id. (“Chris Murrell, director of the Promise of Justice Initiative . . . fears 
prosecutors . . . will at least file for hearings in nearly all [resentencing cases after 
Montgomery]—triggering expensive background investigations for defense attorneys to 
prepare for possible hearings.”).
67 See, e.g., Tatum v. Arizona, 137 S. Ct. 11, 13 (2016) (Sotomayor, J., concurring).
68 Id.
69 See Commonwealth v. Batts, 163 A.3d 410, 457 (Pa. 2017).
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finding of permanent incorrigibility.70 The result is a messy mix of successful 
habeas petitions and affirmed life sentences.71
D. Use Constructive Life Sentences as a Substitute for Juvenile Life 
Without Parole
The Supreme Court’s focus in outlawing the death penalty and limiting the 
availability of juvenile life without parole was juveniles’ potential for 
rehabilitation based on an individualized assessment, not an aggregation of their 
offenses to prove incorrigibility.72 However, states have attempted to undermine 
an individualized assessment for juveniles by sentencing them to long term of 
years sentences or maximum terms to be served consecutively in defiance of the 
Court’s ruling in Graham.73 For example, a Nebraska juvenile originally 
sentenced to life without parole was resentenced to a definite ninety-year term.74
In Ohio, a trial court sentenced a juvenile to consecutive terms totaling 141 
years instead of a juvenile life without parole sentence.75
IV. THE INJUSTICE OF STATE INCONSISTENCY: SAME CRIME, DIFFERENT 
TIME
There is no discernable standard for what constitutes a functional life 
without parole sentence, triggering the protections of Graham.76 This allows 
states to avoid the rehabilitative ideals outlined in the Court’s juvenile 
sentencing jurisprudence by imposing a sentence of a term of years or an 
aggregation of consecutive sentences on juveniles.77 A stream of recent rulings 
from state appellate courts underscores the need for clarification from the 
                                                                                                                     
70 See text accompanying notes 71–90.
71 See Olivier v. Cain, No. 15-5069, 2016 WL 3459887, at *1 (E.D. La. June 24, 2016);
Gillam v. Cain, No. 14-2129, 2016 WL 3060254, at *1 (E.D. La. May 31, 2016); Bryn Stole, 
‘Worst of the Worst’: Judge Says Inmate Who Murdered at 17 Irredeemable, Again 
Sentences Him to Life, THE ADVOCATE (Apr. 19, 2017),
http://www.theadvocate.com/baton_rouge/news/courts/article_c60bc1fc-251b-11e7-9b9c-
6fc86718b9b6.html [https://perma.cc/5B64-TxA2].
72 See Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460, 477–78 (2012). “Graham, Roper, and our 
individualized sentencing decisions make clear that a judge or jury must have the opportunity 
to consider mitigating circumstances before imposing the harshest possible penalty for 
juveniles.” Id. at 489.
73 See, e.g., State v. Ali, 895 N.W.3d 237, 239 (Minn. 2017) cert. denied; Willbanks v. 
Dep’t of Corr., 522 S.W.3d 238, 246–47 (Mo. 2017) cert. denied; Vasquez v. 
Commonwealth, 781 S.E.2d 920, 926 (Va. 2016); see also infra Part V (discussing a 
Maryland trial court’s 100-year sentence for a juvenile convicted of four non-homicide 
offenses).
74 State v. Garza, 888 N.W.2d 526, 534 (Neb. 2016), cert. denied 138 S. Ct. 83 (2017).
75 State v. Moore, 76 N.E.3d 1127, 1130 (Ohio 2016), cert denied, 138 S. Ct. 62 (2017).
76 See infra Part V.
77 See infra Part VI.
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Supreme Court if the spirit of its juvenile sentencing jurisprudence is to be of 
significance.78
Some states have decided there are no constitutional limits on a sentence for 
a single crime committed by a juvenile, as long as the sentence is expressed as 
a term of years. In upholding a ninety-year term for a juvenile, the Nebraska 
Supreme Court stated that the defendant’s “characterization of his sentence as a 
de facto life sentence is immaterial to our analysis of whether his sentence is 
excessive.”79 Furthermore, the Nebraska high court held that so long as a 
juvenile defendant is sentenced to a term of years and will someday be eligible 
for parole, the requirements of Miller are satisfied.80
In Oregon, juveniles are being sentenced to long terms, including the 800-
month (approximately sixty-seven years) sentence at issue in White v. Premo.81
After being sentenced to a determinant life term for aggravated murder to be 
served concurrently to the 800-month term for murder, the juvenile was 
resentenced to a 288-month term for the aggravated murder after Miller.82 In 
addition, the offender was prevented from raising a constitutional argument 
against his sentence because he hadn’t raised the argument in his initial post-
conviction petition, despite the fact the Miller decision had not yet been issued 
at the time of his conviction.83 Thus, the juvenile’s sentence for the lesser 
offense of murder is longer than his sentence for the more serious offense of 
aggravated murder as a result of Oregon procedural law and the state’s reaction 
to the Court’s jurisprudence.84
Other states have decided that when a juvenile is convicted of multiple 
crimes, there is no constitutional protection against a sentence the juvenile will 
not outlive. Georgia, Missouri, and Virginia have undermined the Court’s
jurisprudence by “elevat[ing] form over substance and permit[ing] the label of 
the sentence to supersede the actual result of the imposed sentence.”85 The 
Georgia high court was direct and unanimous in its assertion that the Supreme 
Court’s jurisprudence does not affect the aggregation of sentences or the 
functional equivalent of a life sentence.86
To justify circumventing the Court’s jurisprudence, the Missouri Supreme 
Court argued, “At no point did the Supreme Court consider a juvenile offender 
sentenced to multiple fixed-term periods and whether such terms, in the 
aggregate, were equal to life without parole.”87 In explaining its decision to 
                                                                                                                     
78 Id.
79 Garza, 888 N.W.2d at 535.
80 Id. at 535–36.
81 See White v. Premo, 399 P.3d 1034, 1035 (Or. Ct. App. 2017).
82 Id. at 1037. 
83 Id. at 1039.
84 See id. at 1037.
85 Veal v. State, 810 S.E.2d 127, 128 (Ga. 2018).
86 Id. at 128–29. 
87 Willbanks v. Dep’t of Corr., 522 S.W.3d 238, 243 (Mo. 2017), cert. denied, 138 
S. Ct. 304 (2017). 
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uphold a long aggregated sentence, the majority of the court argued that the 
existence of multiple fixed terms changes the application of the Supreme 
Court’s modified penological justifications for juveniles and stated, “[the 
defendant] and the dissent have failed to show these penological goals are not 
served by sentencing juveniles to multiple fixed-term sentences.”88 The 
Missouri high court also noted language from dissenting Justices in Miller
prospectively excluding juveniles sentenced to a term of years from its 
holding.89
In Virginia, Vasquez v. Commonwealth contains a graphic account of a 
series of crimes perpetrated by two juveniles during a home invasion that 
culminated in a sexual assault against a single victim.90 In recounting the 
brutality of the crimes, the Virginia Supreme Court unwittingly outlines a
perverse incentive of its own creation: by failing to effectively differentiate 
between sentences for homicide and non-homicide crimes, juveniles may be 
encouraged to kill their victims, a risk accentuated by their relative 
immaturity.91
The Virginia Supreme Court also meticulously rejected appeals from the 
two juvenile defendants on the implications of Graham.92 Instead of giving 
“precedential treatment to the ‘reasoning’ in Graham, which generalized that 
‘children are simply less culpable’ than adults and have a ‘greater capacity for 
reform,’” the Virginia high court focused on the “subtle distinction[s]” that 
                                                                                                                     
88 Id.
89 Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 113 n.11 (2010) (Thomas, J., dissenting) (“[I]t seems 
odd that the [Supreme] Court counts only those juveniles sentenced to life without parole 
and excludes from its analysis all juveniles sentenced to lengthy term-of-years sentences 
(e.g., seventy or eighty years’ imprisonment).”).
90 Vazquez v. Commonwealth, 781 S.E.2d 920, 923 (Va. 2016).
91 See id.
Still armed with a knife, Vasquez then pulled the victim toward the window and told 
her that she would have to leave with them. Valentin pushed Vasquez away from the 
victim. Before leaving, Vasquez approached the victim with the knife, “jab[bed] it at 
[her] stomach,” and warned her that they would “come back with thirty guys and kill 
[her]” if she called the police. Police arrested Vasquez and Valentin that same night. 
They had in their possession the property stolen from the townhouse. They made 
various self-incriminating statements to the police and made similar inculpatory 
remarks to each other. Valentin admitted to breaking into the townhouse, stealing 
property, and raping the victim at knifepoint. “What fun is raping a bitch,” he said, “and 
running?” Reflecting on the episode, Valentin concluded: “We’re sixteen and we’re 
getting tried as an adult. [sic] Should have killed that bitch.”
Id. (citations omitted); see also Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 69 (2010) (“[D]efendants 
who do not kill, intend to kill, or foresee that life will be taken are categorically less deserving 
of [life without parole punishment] than are murderers.”); Kennedy v. Louisiana, 554 U.S. 
407, 445 (2008) (“[B]y in effect making the punishment for child rape and murder 
equivalent, a State that punishes child rape by death may remove a strong incentive for the 
rapist not to kill the victim.”).
92 Vasquez, 781 S.E.2d at 925. 
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“makes clear that the Supreme Court did not squarely address aggregate term of 
years sentences.”93 The opinion in Vasquez was emblematic of the reactionary 
limitations on the Supreme Court’s juvenile sentencing jurisprudence in an 
important way: in justifying the sentences imposed on juveniles, whether they 
are sentenced to life without parole or an aggregated sentence, many state courts 
focus on sordid details of the crimes, rather than the modified penological 
objectives for juveniles outlined by the Supreme Court.94 Based on the serious
offenses at issue in Roper, Graham, Miller, Montgomery, and Tatum, the 
Virginia Supreme Court’s reactionary approach is under-inclusive and the 
Eighth Amendment protections described in aforementioned Supreme Court 
cases should guide all juvenile sentences.95 Furthermore, each of the preceding 
decisions failed to take into account the childhood experiences of the juvenile, 
which includes the “family and home environment.”96
Despite the existence of reactionary forces limiting the impact of the 
Supreme Court’s jurisprudence on the only nation that still allows juvenile life 
without parole, the Court’s holdings have impacted the development of state 
juvenile sentencing law.97 Since the Miller holding, thirteen states and the 
District of Columbia have banned juvenile life without parole despite, “the well-
known fact that anticrime legislation is far more popular than legislation 
providing protections for persons guilty of violent crime.”98 The Court has 
characterized this as developing “national consensus” against the imposition of 
mandatory life without parole sentences on juveniles,99 given the majority of 
juvenile life without parole sentences come from just three states.100 In addition,
                                                                                                                     
93 Id. at 925–26, 928.
94 Id. at 922–23.
95 Id. at 925.
96 Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460, 477 (2012); see also Sara B. Johnson et al., 
Adolescent Maturity and the Brain: The Promise and Pitfalls of Neuroscience Research in 
Adolescent Health Policy, J. ADOLESCENT HEALTH 216, 219 (2009) (finding “[b]ehavior in 
adolescence . . . is a function of multiple interactive influences including experience, 
parenting, socio-economic status, nutrition, psychological well-being, and social
relationships and interactions”); Rovner, supra note 11, at 4 (“[f]indings from a survey of 
people sentenced to life in prison as juveniles . . . found . . . 79% witnessed violence in their 
homes regularly, 32% grew up in public housing, 40% had been enrolled in special education 
classes, fewer than half were attending school at the time of their offense, 47% were 
physically abused, 80% of girls reported histories of physical abuse and 77% of girls reported 
histories of sexual abuse.”).
97 CONNIE DE LA VEGA ET AL., UNIV. OF S.F. L. SCH., CTR. FOR L. & GLOB. JUST., CRUEL 
& UNUSUAL: U.S. SENTENCING PRACTICES IN A GLOBAL CONTEXT 59, 61 (2012), available 
at http://www.usfca.edu/sites/default/files/law/cruel-and-unusual.pdf [https://perma.cc/T92
J-BC8L].
98 State v. Bassett, 394 P.3d 430, 444 (Wash. Ct. App. 2017) aff’d 428 P.3d 343 (Wash.
2018).
99 Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 61 (2010).
100 Id. at 62–63 (2010); Rovner, supra note 11; THE SENTENCING PROJECT, JUVENILE 
LIFE WITHOUT PAROLE: AN OVERVIEW 3 (2017). Among the thirty states that allow juvenile 
life without parole, only three states–Pennsylvania, Michigan, and Louisiana– account for 
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several states have responded to the Court with thoughtful reforms that protect 
the Eighth Amendment rights of juveniles.
Perhaps the best example of thoughtful and effective state reforms is found 
in Wyoming. In response to the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence, the Wyoming 
legislature amended the laws governing juvenile sentencing to mandate parole 
eligibility for juveniles after twenty-five years.101 To protect the Eighth 
Amendment rights of juveniles, the Wyoming Supreme Court has not 
overlooked the horrific nature of the crimes at issue or the possibility that some 
people may “turn out to be irredeemable, and thus deserving of incarceration for 
the duration of their lives.”102 However, the Wyoming judiciary recognized that 
the U.S. Supreme Court intended for lifetime punishments to be rare and does 
not allow the aggregation of sentences that result in the functional equivalent of 
life without parole without considering “the teachings of the 
Roper/Graham/Miller trilogy.”103 With these considerations, combined with the 
legislative mandate of parole eligibility for juveniles after twenty-five years, 
Wyoming has created a framework for protecting the Eighth Amendment rights 
of juveniles that is reflective of the Supreme Court’s holdings. The Wyoming 
high court upheld these principles with its ruling in Sam v. Wyoming, which 
struck down a sentence of fifty-two years to life for a juvenile defendant.104
While Wyoming’s reforms are laudable, they are of no consequence to juveniles 
in Georgia, Oregon, or Virginia creating a constitutional issue requiring the 
Court’s attention.
V. DIRECTION FROM SCOTUS: THE EIGHTH AMENDMENT REQUIRES A
PAROLE HEARING FOR JUVENILES AFTER TWENTY-FIVE YEARS
Recent history indicates the states will be unable to self-regulate in a way 
that provides constitutional consistency for juvenile defendants, especially 
given the “tough on crime” mindset that has become a mainstay in American 
political rhetoric. The last several decades have been characterized by strong 
nationwide pressures toward prison growth on a scale unprecedented in human 
history.105 However, the ability to address this unfortunate phenomenon is 
                                                                                                                     
about two-thirds of the juvenile life without parole sentences being served. Id. But see 
Graham, 560 U.S. at 124 (Alito, J., dissenting) (“[N]othing in the Court’s opinion affects the 
imposition of a sentence to a term of years without the possibility of parole.”) Thus, this 
statistic does not account for functional juvenile life without parole sentences that impact 
thousands more juveniles.
101 WYO. STAT. ANN. §§ 6–2–101(b), 6–10–301(c) (2017).
102 Bear Cloud v. State, 334 P.3d 132, 144 (Wyo. 2014) (quoting Graham, 560 U.S. at 
75).
103 Id. at 141–42, 144.
104 Sam v. Wyoming, 401 P.3d 834, 860 (Wyo. 2017), cert. denied, 138 S. Ct. 1988 
(2018).
105 See Fact Sheet: Trends in U.S. Corrections, THE SENTENCING PROJECT (June 2018),
https://www.sentencingproject.org/publications/trends-in-u-s-corrections/ [https://perma.cc
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almost always limited by confines of federalism.106 In describing his role in 
advancing criminal justice reform, President Barack Obama emphasized “states 
and localities oversee most of policing, as well as 90% of the prison 
population.”107 President Obama recognized the political consequences state 
governors and public officials face when “correct[ing] injustices in the system 
… and reminding people of the value of second chances.”108 At the state level, 
political pressure to avoid the perception of leniency on criminal defendants 
stems from the obligation to run for reelection and represent the interests of the 
community for a short period of time, relative to a life sentence.109 The pressure 
dissuading governors from using their clemency power described by President 
Obama also applies to the legislatures that authorized mandatory life 
sentences110 and to most state judges making sentencing decisions.111
State legislatures are also susceptible to the influence of reactionary, tough-
on-crime advocacy groups interested in preventing criminal justice reform. 
These groups can include police associations, victims’ advocacy groups, and 
prosecuting attorneys organizations.112 Prosecutors have already flexed their 
political muscle to prevent juvenile sentencing reform, most notably in 
Louisiana, where the Louisiana District Attorney Association (LDAA) staged a 
last-minute intervention that prevented the legislature from eliminating juvenile 
life without parole sentences.113 The LDAA took full advantage of the political 
effectiveness using scare tactics to criticize departures from tough on crime 
                                                                                                                     
/3ZA3-34N5] (detailing the 500% population increase in U.S. prisons and jails over the last 
forty years); Edward E. Rhine et al., Improving Parole Release in America, 28 FED. SENT’G
REP. 96, 103 (2015).
106 See generally United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995) (limiting the ability of the 
federal government to convert the general police power retained by states).
107 Barack Obama, The President’s Role in Advancing Criminal Justice Reform, 130
HARV. L. REV. 811, 838 (2017).
108 Id.; see also Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 69–70 (2010) (noting the likelihood of 
being granted executive clemency is only a “remote possibility”). 
109 Obama, supra note 107, at 819.
110 Id. at 838.
111 A total of thirty-nine states hold elections for trial courts of general jurisdiction and 
intermediate appellate courts. Thirty-eight states hold elections for their high courts. AM.
BAR ASS’N, FACT SHEET ON JUDICIAL SELECTION METHOD IN THE STATES (2018), available 
at https://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/migrated/leadership/fact_sheet.auth
checkdam.pdf [https://perma.cc/8GR6-YTCA].
112 See e.g., Associated Press, Justice Varies for Juvenile Lifers in U.S. Prisons, N.Y.
DAILY NEWS (July 31, 2017), www.nydailynews.com/news/national/justice-varies-juvenile-
lifers-u-s-prisons-article-1.3370922 [https://perma.cc/45VZ-HL7W]. Sheriff Michael 
Bouchard of Oakland County, Michigan described juveniles up for resentencing after the 
Montgomery decision as “young Hannibal Lecters.” Id. The prosecutor is seeking no parole 
in forty-four of forty-nine cases. Id.
113 Jessica Pishko, ‘We’re Basically Guessing on These Cases’: Louisiana’s Disastrous 
Resentencing Hearings, NATION (Dec. 22, 2017), https://www.thenation.com/article/
were-basically-guessing-on-these-cases-louisianas-disastrous-resentencing-hearings/ 
[https://perma.cc/NM88-G95N].
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policies and publicly accused members of the legislature of risking the safety of 
Louisianans.114 The political backlash was so swift and effective that Louisiana 
prosecutors retained the ability to seek juvenile life without parole and were 
permitted to seek life without parole for those seeking resentencing after 
Montgomery.115
In addition, state judiciaries are not above the reactionary political pressure 
that can have undue influence on juvenile sentencing law. On December 22, 
2016, the Ohio Supreme Court decided State v. Aalim (Aalim I), which required 
a discretionary process for a juvenile defendant’s case to be transferred to adult 
court, rather than mandating a transfer to adult court for certain offenses.116 The 
Aalim I decision was vacated upon reconsideration less than six months later 
after two justices in the majority were forced off the court by Ohio’s mandatory 
retirement age, including the author of the majority opinion.117 The new justice 
casting the decisive vote reversing Aalim I received a “Not Recommended”
rating from the Ohio State Bar Association118 and is the son of the Ohio 
Attorney General and 2018 governor-elect, whose office litigated the state’s
position before the Ohio Supreme Court in 2016.119
One dissenting justice lamented the reconsideration decision in Aalim II,
noting “there is nothing new to reconsider here; the only thing that has changed 
is the makeup of this court as a result of the 2016 election.”120 In her dissent, the 
                                                                                                                     
114 Id.
115 Id.
116 State v. Aalim (Aalim I), 83 N.E.3d 862, 870 (Ohio 2016), reconsideration granted, 
decision vacated (“We now recognize that because children are constitutionally required to 
be treated differently from adults for purposes of sentencing, juvenile procedures themselves 
also must account for the differences in children versus adults. The mandatory-transfer 
statutes preclude a juvenile-court judge from taking any individual circumstances into 
account before automatically sending a child who is 16 or older to adult court. This one-size-
fits-all approach runs counter to the aims and goals of the juvenile system, and even those 
who would be amenable to the juvenile system are sent to adult court. Juvenile-court judges 
must be allowed the discretion that the General Assembly permits for other children. They 
should be able to distinguish between those children who should be treated as adults and 
those who should not.”). State v. Aalim (Aalim II), 83 N.E.3d 883, 896 (Ohio 2017).
117 Aalim II, 83 N.E.3d at 896; Judith Ann Lanzinger, BALLOTPEDIA (Mar. 18, 2018), 
https://ballotpedia.org/Judith_Ann_Lanzinger [https://perma.cc/93T2-ZFD6]; Paul Pfeifer,
BALLOTPEDIA (Mar. 18, 2018), https://ballotpedia.org/Paul_Pfeifer [https://perma.cc/857P-
VYAD].
118 Aalim II, 83 N.E.3d at 897 (DeWine, J., concurring); see also OSBA Announces 




119 See generally Jessie Balmert, Mike DeWine-John Husted: What the GOP Team 
Means for the 2018 Race, CIN. ENQUIRER (Nov. 30, 2017), https://www.cincinnati.com/story/
news/politics/2017/11/30/dewine-husted-what-gop-team-means-2018-race/908589001/
[https://perma.cc/2Y2A-MK6G] (discussing the money, organizational capacity, and name 
recognition associated with the DeWine name). 
120 Aalim II, 83 N.E.3d at 914 (O’Neill, J., dissenting).
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Chief Justice was more apologetic about the implications of the reconsideration 
decision, asserting the majority bowed “to the basest instincts of an outspoken 
faction of our society—fear and anger…[i]n its effort to punish the 
appellant.”121 The Chief Justice also noted the majority’s abdication of its 
judicial prerogative to the reactionary interests controlling the legislative and 
executive branches stating, “the majority’s decision today brings us one step 
closer to the anarchy about which Madison warned…the judiciary’s role [is to] 
ensur[e] that no legislative act contrary to the Constitution be allowed to 
stand.”122 Finally, the Chief Justice hinted at the appropriateness for review by 
the U.S. Supreme Court, noting the role of the U.S. Constitution in protecting 
justice for Ohio’s children and the potential the impact of the majority’s decision 
would be short-lived.123
Ohio’s odyssey with juvenile transfer law is illustrative of the short-term 
political pitfalls that interrupt the formulation of Constitutional rights, which 
includes the issue of juvenile life without parole. Justice Judith Lanzinger, the 
author of the majority opinion in Ohio v. Moore—which invalidated a 112-year 
sentence citing Graham on the same day as the Aalim I decision—also left the 
court due to the age limit, placing the Moore precedent in the same political 
jeopardy as the Aalim I precedent.124
Maryland’s adventure with juvenile life without parole is illustrative of the 
same see-sawing that occurred in Ohio. In McCullough v. State, the Court of 
Special Appeals of Maryland upheld a 100-year sentence for a juvenile 
convicted of four non-homicide offenses, displaying a degree of receptiveness 
to the Supreme Court’s rehabilitative ideals.125 To support its decision, the court 
                                                                                                                     
121 Id. at 900 (O’Connor, J., dissenting).  
122 Id.
123 Id.
124 State v. Moore, 76 N.E.3d 1127, 1137 (Ohio 2016) (quoting Montgomery, 136 S. Ct. 
at 736–37) (“The intent was not to eventually allow juvenile offenders the opportunity to 
leave prison in order to die but to live part of their lives in society. The court stated in 
Montgomery, a case involving a defendant who had been convicted of murder as a juvenile, 
‘In light of what this Court has said in Roper, Graham, and Miller about how children are 
constitutionally different from adults in their level of culpability, prisoners like Montgomery 
must be given the opportunity to show their crime did not reflect irreparable corruption; and, 
if it did not, their hope for some years of life outside prison walls must be restored.’”).
125 McCullough v. State, 168 A.3d 1045, 1071 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2017), rev’d sub 
nom. Carter v. State, 192 A.3d 695 (Md. 2018). At his sentencing hearing, Matthew Timothy 
McCollough read the following statement: 
Your Honor, I would like to say what happened on May 7th was a tragedy. I’d like to 
apologize for what happened that day and I’d like to apologize for putting the victims 
and their families through the pain and suffering. And I know that a punishment is 
acceptable, and I’m here to accept the punishment. Thank you. 
Id. at 1046. The sentencing judge responded by characterizing his crimes as “vicious and 
heinous,” asserted McCullough had shown no remorse, and referred to him as a “coward”
and a “suburban terrorist” before handing down the 100-year sentence for four non-homicide 
offenses. Id. at 1046–47.
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cited decisions from states that consistently test the limits of constitutional 
permissibility with their juvenile criminal sentencing, including Arizona, 
Louisiana, and Florida.126 In addition, the Maryland court argued that 
aggregating sentences for separate convictions reflected a series of judgments 
about each offense that serve the goals of punishment, deterrence, and 
rehabilitation.127 Finally, the court cited precedent from courts in Maryland and 
other jurisdictions regarding sentencing decisions for adult defendants 
convicted of multiple crimes in this juvenile case.128 This series of judgments is 
seemingly incompatible with the modified penological goals outlined by the 
Supreme Court in its juvenile sentencing jurisprudence.
In constitutional matters, it is the prerogative of the Supreme Court to 
collaborate with the states and their institutions to protect “the basic and 
essential term in the social compact which defines the rights of the individual 
and delimits the powers which the state may exercise.”129 The Court must 
exercise this prerogative and collaborate with the states to eliminate juvenile life 
without parole and develop an alternative that protects the constitutional rights 
of juveniles and public safety.
Though the Court of Appeals of Maryland reversed the sentence of the trial 
court in the McCullough case and remanded for resentencing, it simultaneously 
highlighted the need for specific direction to define the constitutional rights of 
juvenile criminal defendants. Despite the fact that McCullough’s aggregated 
100-year sentence was found unconstitutional, the court ordered that he “be re-
sentenced to a disposition that is not equivalent to life without parole” without 
articulating the limits of this standard and encouraging trial judges to “freely
and openly disclose the factors weighed in arriving at the final disposition.”130
Presumably, the original Maryland sentencing court was aware of the Supreme 
Court’s past juvenile sentencing jurisprudence. However, while the Court of 
Appeals of Maryland’s recited the Court’s holdings in Roper, Graham, and 
Miller, it did not provide enhanced guidance in the context of Maryland 
sentencing law, nor did it crystallize the malleable standards embedded in 
                                                                                                                     
126 Id. at 1053–54, 1059–61.
127 Id. at 1067 (internal citation omitted).
128 Id. at 1067–69. “[E]ach sentence is a separate punishment for a separate offense.” Id.
at 1067 (citing Lucero v. People, 394 P.3d 1128 (Colo. 2018)). “[I]t is wrong to treat stacked 
sanctions as a single sanction.” Id. at 1069 (citing Pearson v. Ramos, 237 F.3d 881, 886 (7th 
Cir. 2001)).
129 In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 20 (1967).
130 Carter v. State, 192 A.3d 695 (Md. 2018). The court further opined that McCollough 
must be parole eligible before serving fifty years of his sentence, as required by Maryland 
parole eligibility law. Id. Ironically, had McCollough been sentenced to life without parole 
at his original trial, he would have been eligible for parole after serving forty-three years 
because of the reforms contained in CR § 14-101. Id. The court did not explicitly comment 
on the seven year discrepancy between the two outcomes, though it did imply the sentencing 
court should examine factors like life expectancy and the circumstances of the juvenile’s
crimes on remand. Id.
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consecutive sentencing determinations.131 Without enhanced guidance, 
Maryland sentencing courts and other courts around the country are left to 
contend with the substantive constitutional rights of those convicted as juveniles 
under amorphous descriptions from appellate courts and the intervening 
interpretations provided by litigants.
After considering the aforementioned political realities, a viable fix could 
come from state parole systems. When properly managed, state parole systems 
can act as a safeguard against the “tough on crime” attitudes that have informed 
criminal justice policies for decades, or at least act as a vehicle for an 
opportunity to obtain release for rehabilitated young person. Despite the 
political pressure elected officials face, the Supreme Court has recognized the 
practice of releasing prisoners on parole before the end of their sentences is an 
integral part of the penological system for nearly fifty years.132 Its purpose is to 
reintegrate individuals into society as soon as they are able and alleviate the 
costs of keeping an individual in prison.133 States also retain enforcement power 
over parolees with the ability to impose conditions of parole and the power to 
revoke parole and force parolees serve out the balance of their sentence if 
conditions are violated.134
In Roper, Graham, Miller, and its predecessors, the Supreme Court 
presumed “the evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a 
maturing society” would limit the availability of harsh punishments to juveniles 
through the gears of federalism and state governance.135 In each of its holdings 
in juvenile sentencing law, the Court outlined how each of the penological 
justifications apply differently to juveniles as compared to adults.136 Implicit in 
its jurisprudence was the expectation that states would respond by reforming 
their juvenile sentencing laws to limit the availability of juvenile life without 
parole sentences.137 While some states have met this expectation by instituting 
reforms in keeping with the spirit of Supreme Court jurisprudence, other states 
have resisted the Court’s interpretation of the Eighth Amendment’s protections 
                                                                                                                     
131 Id.
132 Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 477 (1972) (“During the past 60 years, the 
practice of releasing prisoners on parole before the end of their sentences has become an 
integral part of the penelogical system.”) (internal citation omitted).
133 Id.
134 Id. at 478–79.
135 Roper, 543 U.S. at 561; Miller, 567 U.S. at 469.
136 See Miller, 567 U.S. at 472–73 (citing Roper, 543 U.S. at 571); Graham v. Florida, 
560 U.S. 48, 71–74 (2010). The penological justification of retribution is not as strong with 
a minor because they are less blameworthy. Deterrence is not as effective because immaturity 
and recklessness make juveniles less likely to consider punishment. Incapacitation is an 
ineffective justification because deciding a juvenile will forever be a danger to society is 
inconsistent with a proper understanding of youthfulness. Rehabilitation is not a justification 
because juvenile life without parole inherently eliminates the rehabilitative ideal.
137 Sarah Childress, Why States Are Changing Course on Juvenile Crime,
FRONTLINE (Dec. 17, 2014), https://www.pbs.org/wgbh/frontline/article/why-states-are-
changing-course-on-juvenile-crime/ [https://perma.cc/JN3L-JJCD].
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as applied to juveniles.138 As a result, the less-blameworthy juveniles declared 
ripe for rehabilitation by the Supreme Court are denied the benefits of parole 
consideration, while society is saddled with the cost of their continued 
incarceration.139
The Court’s jurisprudence makes special mention of the influence of peers 
in the decision-making processes of juveniles.140 The realities of juvenile brain 
development have been documented in studies examining their developmental 
psychology.141 Such realities should be a prime consideration when determining 
sentences for juveniles involved in a crime with multiple defendants. Juvenile 
prisoners are the most susceptible to this dynamic, as they will spend a higher 
proportion of their lives incarcerated relative to any other group of the prison 
population.142
To date, the Court’s broadest and most direct holding is its ban on capital 
punishment for juveniles.143 Moving forward, the Supreme Court should 
connect its jurisprudence on juvenile sentencing to the basic purposes of parole 
it articulated in Morrissey to announce new Eighth Amendment protections for 
juveniles sentenced to juvenile life without parole. The Court should also define 
functional life without parole sentence as any sentence greater than twenty-five 
years and include such sentences in its new Eighth Amendment protections. In 
announcing new substantive rights, the Court should make explicit that the 
rehabilitative ideal is the dominant penological goal in mandating a meaningful 
opportunity to obtain release for all juveniles. The Court should further 
articulate the penological goal of rehabilitation is best achieved with the 
opportunity for parole after twenty-five years in all juvenile criminal sentences. 
                                                                                                                     
138 Id.
139 See id.
140 Roper, 543 U.S. at 569; Miller, 567 U.S. at 471 (“Roper and Graham establish that 
children are constitutionally different from adults for purposes of sentencing…. [C]hildren 
‘are more vulnerable . . . to negative influences and outside pressures,’ including from their 
family and peers; they have limited ‘contro[l] over their environment’ and lack the ability to 
extricate themselves from horrific, crime producing settings . . . . [A] child’s character is not 
as ‘well formed’ as an adult’s; his traits are ‘less fixed’ and his actions less likely to be 
‘evidence of irretrievab[le] deprav[ity].”).
141 See generally Margo Gardner & Laurence Steinberg, Peer Influence on Risk Taking, 
Risk Preference, and Risky Decision Making in Adolescence and Adulthood: An 
Experimental Study, 41 DEVELOPMENTAL PSYCHO. 625 (2005) (finding risk taking and risky 
decision-making decreased with age, participants took more risks, focused more on the 
benefits than the costs of risky behavior, and made riskier decisions when in peer groups 
than alone; and peer effects on risk taking and risky decision-making were stronger among 
adolescents and youths than adults).
142 Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 70 (2010). “Life without parole is an especially harsh 
punishment for a juvenile. Under this sentence a juvenile offender will on average serve 
more years and a greater percentage of his life in prison than an adult offender.” Id.
143 Roper, 543 U.S. at 575. (“[T]he death penalty cannot be imposed on juvenile 
offenders.”).
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A. Procedural Safeguards at Sentencing Will Never Protect Juvenile’s
Eighth Amendment Rights
On top of the incentive to “max and stack” instead of making an 
individualized assessment of each juvenile, states can simply resentence to the 
same offenses with little to no procedural oversight.144 Thus, the incentives for 
prosecutors are the same for juvenile and adult defendants alike: charge the 
highest counts and seek the maximum penalty for each offense.145 As a result, 
judges sentencing juvenile defendants are confined by their state’s sentencing 
procedures for allied or related offenses, rather than the ideals outlined by the 
Supreme Court in its juvenile sentencing jurisprudence.146 Without additional 
protection from an intervening statute or guidance from the Supreme Court, 
protections for juvenile defendants charged as adults can be easily undermined.
The inadequacy of procedural safeguards at sentencing is not limited to 
stacked sentences. Juveniles deemed permanently incorrigible also face the risk 
of a wrong determination, which is inherently colored by racial bias.147 Juveniles 
sentenced in the past also face the expense of looking backward and cannot 
demonstrate their rehabilitative progress, however relevant it may be to having
been labeled permanently incorrigible.148
B. Risk of Wrong Determination
Though juvenile life without parole sentences are supposed to be reserved 
for the “worst of the worst,”149 states have shown a pattern of applying juvenile 
life without parole in an uneven manner.150 Even after the Court’s
pronouncements in Montgomery, where the State of Louisiana was a named 
litigant, prosecutors are asking for life without parole at resentencing at 
                                                                                                                     
144 See Pishko, supra note 113 (detailing the prosecutorial zeal for life without parole on 
resentencing).
145 Id.
146 See e.g., Veal v. State, 810 S.E.2d 127, 128 (Ga. 2018) (accepting the elevation of 
form over substance in examining the consequences of juvenile sentencing). In Veal, the 
relevant Georgia statutory provision will require the defendant to spend sixty years in prison 
before he is eligible for a parole hearing due to his aggregated sentence. Id. at 128.
147 Rovner, supra note 11 (“23.2% of juvenile arrests for murder involve an African 
American suspected of killing a white person, 42.4% of [juvenile life without parole] 
sentences are for an African American convicted of this crime. White juvenile offenders with 
African American victims are only about half as likely (3.6%) to receive a juvenile life 
without parole sentence as their proportion of arrests for killing an African American 
(6.4%).”); see also supra Part IV.
148 See Pishko, supra note 113.
149 Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460, 489 (2012).
150 See Rovner, supra note 11, at 4 (detailing the racial disparities present in the 
imposition of juvenile life without parole sentences).
2018] LIFERS AFTER MONTGOMERY 1013
alarmingly high rates.151 Juvenile life without parole sentencing decisions are 
also colored by inescapable questions of race. Nationwide, black defendants
have been twice as likely to receive a juvenile life without parole sentence as 
white defendants sentenced for the same crimes.152 Similar disparities have been
rebuked by the Supreme Court offensive to the purpose of the Eighth 
Amendment in the context of the death penalty.153
There is also significant concern that state court systems are ill-equipped to 
handle the determination of permanent incorrigibility. A Washington court 
describes this problem effectively, stating “the sentencing court is placed in the 
impossible position of predicting…which juveniles will prove to be irretrievably 
corrupt. The sentencing court must separate the irretrievably corrupt juveniles 
from those whose crimes reflect transient immaturity—a task even expert 
psychologists cannot complete with certainty.”154 The court described an 
“unacceptable risk that that juvenile offenders whose crimes reflect transient 
immaturity will be sentenced to life without parole” because of inadequate state 
procedural fixes in response to the Miller ruling.155 The Massachusetts Supreme 
Court has also determined “a conclusive showing of traits such as an 
‘irretrievably depraved character,’ can never be made, with integrity, by the 
Commonwealth at an individualized hearing to determine whether a sentence of 
life without parole should be imposed on a juvenile homicide offender.”156
This problem is accentuated for the juveniles originally sentenced decades 
ago. The prosecutors handling resentencing cases after Montgomery often have 
little knowledge of the cases for which they are seeking an affirmation of the
                                                                                                                     
151 See Pishko, supra note 113 (“The failed reforms have allowed harsh sentencing to 
continue unabated. Leon Cannizzaro, the district attorney of Orleans Parish, has sought 29 
life without parole sentences for juveniles out of the 45 current unresolved cases. In 
Calcaseiu Parish, the prosecutor John DeRosier is seeking life without parole in 7 in 8. Hillar 
Moore, the former president of the LDAA sought life without parole again in 38 percent of 
cases in his district. And the new president of the LDAA, Ricky Babin, is seeking [life 
without parole] for four in five cases in his district.”).
152 JOHN R. MILLS ET AL., PHILLIPS BLACK PROJECT, NO HOPE: RE-EXAMINING LIFETIME 
SENTENCES FOR JUVENILE OFFENDERS 10, available at https://static1.squarespace.com/static
/55bd511ce4b0830374d25948/t/5600cc20e4b0f36b5caabe8a/1442892832535/JLWOP+2.p
df [https://perma.cc/F2UD-USNF]; see also supra Part IV and accompanying footnotes.
153 See Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 239–40 (1972) (per curiam) (reversing three 
death penalty sentences under the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments). Justice Marshall 
noted execution of African Americans was far more likely and impermissible stating, “A
total of 3,859 persons have been executed since 1930, of whom 1,751 were white and 2,066 
were Negro.” Id. at 364 (Marshall, J., concurring) (internal citation omitted). Justice Douglas 
said this application of criminal punishment was “pregnant with discrimination” and “an 
ingredient not compatible with the idea of equal protection of the laws that is implicit in the 
ban on ‘cruel and unusual’ punishments.” Id. at 256–57 (Douglas, J., concurring).
154 State v. Bassett, 394 P.3d 430, 445 (Wash. Ct. App. 2017), aff’d 428 P.3d 343 (Wash. 
2018).
155 Id.
156 Diatchenko v. Dist. Attorney for Suffolk Dist., 1 N.E.3d 270, 283–84 (Mass. 2013)
(internal citation omitted).
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life sentence.157 The Orleans Parish district attorney believes parole boards are 
the best bodies to handle the question of a juveniles’ rehabilitative potential, 
saying “we’re basically guessing on these cases…I think this is an unfair call 
for the district attorney.”158 Similar problems, as well as opposition and 
uncertainty, have created an uneven patchwork of results in other states 
resentencing juveniles.159
C. Expense of Looking Backward
The determination of a juvenile’s permanent incorrigibility has been applied 
inconsistently across the states before and after the Miller ruling.160 As a result, 
litigating a juvenile’s eligibility for juvenile life without parole is speculative at 
the time of sentencing and expensive in hindsight. In fact, the bill for “looking 
back” at the juvenile in the context of a resentencing can range from $50,000 to 
$75,000 per case.161 Other estimates place the bill on understaffed and 
overworked offices at $56,000 per case.162 This expense is impractical for cash-
strapped state and local governments and poorly funded public defense agencies 
across the country and exacerbated by prosecutors who continue to seek life 
without parole sentences for juvenile defendants, new and old.163 Arizona will 
have to refine its procedures for determining a juvenile permanently incorrigible 
after the Court deemed them inadequate in Tatum v. Arizona without providing 
additional guidance.164 Thus, states will be left to resentence people for their 
youthful crimes years after their original sentencing without all of the relevant 
evidence or the benefit of specific guidance from the Supreme Court. 
D. States Are Equipped to Monitor the Rehabilitation of Juveniles
States can readily and easily use institutional records to make parole 
decisions, as opposed to having evidentiary hearings about the juvenile 
immediately following the offense.165 However, not all state reforms fully 
                                                                                                                     
157 Pishko, supra note 113.
158 Id.
159 See generally Cohen, supra note 50 (describing the range of reactions from interested 
parties, including the victims’ families, prosecutors, and the deaths of family members 
during the defendant’s incarceration).
160 See supra Part III.D.
161 Stole, supra note 58.
162 Pishko, supra note 113.
163 Id.
164 Tatum v. Arizona, 137 S Ct. 11, 11 (2016) (Sotomayor, J., concurring).
165
Extending parole eligibility to juvenile offenders does not impose an onerous burden on 
the States, nor does it disturb the finality of state convictions. Those prisoners who have 
shown an inability to reform will continue to serve life sentences. The opportunity for 
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protect the Eighth Amendment rights of juveniles. Prior to the Montgomery
decision, several states confronted the question of whether the Eighth 
Amendment required retroactive resentencing for those with juvenile life
without parole sentences. Kentucky has prohibited juvenile life without parole 
since 1987 and provides juveniles with an opportunity for parole after twenty-
five years.166 However, even after Montgomery, Kentucky has refused to apply 
its ban on juvenile life without parole retroactively to two people previously 
convicted and sentenced.167 Though it had no juveniles with life without parole 
sentences at the time,168 Kansas also outlawed juvenile life without parole in 
2011 by making all those sentenced to life terms eligible for parole after twenty-
five years.169
Nevada had sixteen juvenile life without parole prisoners in 2015 when it 
outlawed the sentence in most instances and retroactively applied sentencing 
protections to previously convicted juveniles.170 Nevada law requires 
sentencing courts to consider the differences between juvenile and adult 
defendants, though these protections do not apply to cases involving multiple 
victims.171
                                                                                                                     
release will be afforded to those who demonstrate the truth of Miller’s central 
intuition—that children who commit even heinous crimes are capable of change. 
Montgomery v. Louisiana, 136 S. Ct. 718, 736 (2016).
166 KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 640.040(1), (3) (LexisNexis 2014); THE PHILLIPS BLACK 




167 THE PHILLIPS BLACK PROJECT, supra note 166, at 41. Kevin Stanford was seventeen 
when he was charged and subsequently convicted and sentenced to death for the rape and 
murder of a store clerk. Associated Press, 4 in Kentucky Seek New Sentences for Juvenile 
Murder Cases, COURIER J. (July 31, 2017), https://www.courier-journal.com/story/news/
crime/2017/08/01/4-kentucky-seek-new-sentences-juvenile-murder-cases/527984001/ 
[https://perma.cc/8FJG-R6XB]. When he first went to prison, Stanford was classified as 
mentally disabled, but has since earned an associate’s degree, participated in prison 
programming, and earned the support of a prison warden and pastor for his clemency 
application. Id. David Buchanan was Stanford’s accomplice and did not shoot the victim, but 
received a functional life sentence after the Kentucky Parole Board denied his first request 
for release. Id.; see also Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 69 (2010) (“When compared to an 
adult murderer, a juvenile offender who did not kill or intend to kill has a twice diminished 
moral culpability.”). Sophal Phon was sixteen when he was ordered to kill by the gang’s
leader. Associated Press, supra note 167; see also Graham, 560 U.S. at 68 (citing Roper v. 
Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 569 (2005)) (“[Juveniles] are more vulnerable or susceptible to 
negative influences and outside pressures, including peer pressure.”). 
168 THE PHILLIPS BLACK PROJECT, supra note 166, at 39. 
169 KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-6618 (2011 & Supp. 2017); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-6620(b)(1) 
(Supp. 2017).
170 THE PHILLIPS BLACK PROJECT, supra note 166, at 61.
171 NEV. REV. STAT. § 176.015 (LexisNexis 2016).
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Massachusetts provided an excellent model for state governments after 
Miller by mandating parole eligibility for juveniles and evaluating the 
rehabilitative progress of its juvenile population. First, the Massachusetts 
Supreme Court abolished juvenile life without parole in 2013 and held its ruling 
applied retroactively.172 The legislature responded by guaranteeing parole 
eligibility for all juveniles by statute.173 Significantly, Massachusetts also 
provides statutory protections for incarcerated juveniles distinct from those 
sentenced to a prison term as an adult.174 Massachusetts law differentiates 
between the mandatory term of incarceration for first and second-degree 
murder, depending on whether the offender is a juvenile or adult.175 In addition,
juveniles in Massachusetts have procedural protections to ensure they are 
afforded the meaningful opportunity to obtain release, as required by 
Graham.176 Unlike their adult counterparts, juveniles convicted of first- or 
second-degree murder in Massachusetts are entitled to counsel and expert 
services at their parole hearings.177 Furthermore, juveniles in Massachusetts are 
afforded full access to educational and treatment programs and must be placed 
in minimum security facilities, provided they have met their rehabilitative
goals.178 Thus, states have proven themselves capable of constructing a 
corrections system responsive to the rehabilitative needs of juveniles, while 
using parole to protect the Eighth Amendment’s demand of proportionality.
E. The Eighth Amendment Requires the Supreme Court to Cap 
Mandatory Juvenile Terms at Twenty-Five Years
Because of the inconsistency in states’ administration of Eighth 
Amendment protections for juveniles, the Court must respond with a powerful 
remedy. The most suitable way to recognize the special context of penological 
                                                                                                                     
172 Diatchenko v. Dist. Attorney for the Suffolk Dist., 1 N.E.3d 270, 276–84 (Mass. 
2013).
173 MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 265 § 2 (West 2018); MASS. GEN. LAWS. ANN. ch. 279 
§ 24 (West 2018). 
174 MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 119 § 72B (Westlaw through Chapter 207, and sections 
19 and 21 of Chapter 228 of the 2018 2nd Annual Session) amended by 2014 Mass. Acts ch. 
189, § 2 (West).
175 Id. (mandating parole eligibility for juveniles convicted of first-degree murder and 
parole eligibility for juveniles convicted of second-degree murder after fifteen years, as 
opposed to twenty-five years for an adult); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 265 § 2 (Westlaw 
through Chapter 207, and sections 19 and 21 of Chapter 228 of the 2018 2nd Annual Session) 
amended by 2014 Mass. Acts ch. 189, § 2 (West); MASS. GEN. LAWS. ANN. ch. 279 § 24
(Westlaw through Chapter 207, and sections 19 and 21 of Chapter 228 of the 2018 2nd 
Annual Session) amended by 2014 Mass. Acts ch. 189, § 2 (West).
176 See Diatchenko, 27 N.E.3d at 353.
177 Id.
178 MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 119 § 72B (Westlaw through Chapter 207, and Sections 
19 and 21 of Chapter 228 of the 2018 2nd Annual Session) amended by 2014 Mass. Acts ch. 
189, § 2 (West).
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goals as applied to juveniles and individualize justice for each juvenile 
defendant is to perform a new evaluation into each offender’s criminality and 
provide an opportunity to obtain release after twenty-five years of 
incarceration.179 This requires clarification of the categorical rule first outlined
in Graham in light of the new developments in brain science to eliminate the 
risk of a “depriv[ing] the convict of the most basic liberties without giving hope 
of restoration, except perhaps by executive clemency—the remote possibility of 
which does not mitigate the harshness of the sentence.”180 Eliminating juvenile 
life without parole does not guarantee release of any person with a long 
sentence.181 Rather, such action would provide that an opportunity for review 
be granted after a reasonable period of incarceration, taking into consideration 
the unique circumstances of each defendant.182
Though requiring parole hearings for juveniles imposes a new constitutional 
obligation for states, they would retain discretion about release decisions. In 
addition, states would be more accountable to the ideals outlined in the Supreme 
Court’s jurisprudence and more likely to identify penological strategies that aid 
in the rehabilitation of their juvenile population. Such accountability has been 
wholly inadequate in the view of many commentators, including John O’Hair, 
who ironically saw more than ninety juveniles sentenced to life when he was 
prosecutor in Wayne County, Michigan.183 A method of compliance that 
includes parole eligibility after twenty-five years of incarceration is an efficient 
solution that balances the rights of the offender with the interests of the state.
In considering the proportionality of a twenty-five-year sentence before 
their first opportunity for parole, the Court should consider that all juveniles
sentenced to a life term will have spent more time incarcerated than as a member 
of society outside of prison.184 In addition, twenty-five years is a modest floor 
for parole eligibility, considering the international standard is ten-to-fifteen 
years and states would retain the ability to allow parole eligibility sooner.185
Furthermore, it is unlikely any of these juveniles would be released before their 
fortieth birthdays, depending on their age at the commission of the crime and 
their states’ laws for charging them in adult court. These factors illustrate the 
                                                                                                                     
179 See Richard J. Bonnie & Elizabeth S. Scott, The Teenage Brain: Adolescent Brain 
Research and the Law, 22 CURRENT DIRECTIONS PSYCHOL. SCI. 158 (2013) (exploring the 
influence of adolescent brain science on law and public policy, including its influence on 
decisions by the Supreme Court). Professors Bonnie and Scott “argue that current research 
cannot contribute usefully to legal decisions about individual adolescents and should not be 
used in criminal trials at the present time, except to provide general developmental 
information.” Id.
180 Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 69–70 (2010).
181 Rovner, supra note 11, at 4. 
182 Id.
183 Cohen & Geller, supra note 50 (“It’s taking far too long to get . . . judges and 
prosecutors to understand that the mandates of the Supreme Court are not optional.”).
184 See Graham, 560 U.S. at 70–71 (noting the percentage of a juvenile’s life under 
incarceration is a relevant consideration in weighing the proportionality of sentences).
185 Rovner, supra note 11, at 4–5. 
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value of the opportunity to obtain release for each juvenile and relieve society 
of the cost of incarcerating a reformed ex-offender.186 This reform would also 
create new opportunities for states to expand on rehabilitative programming for 
young people based on the evolving body of juvenile brain science that 
motivated the Court in Roper, Graham, and Miller.187 Perhaps in the future, 
developments in juvenile rehabilitative programming spearheaded by the states 
can make twenty-five-year sentences the harshest expectation for juveniles 
convicted of the most serious crimes in our society.
F. Advancements in Brain Science Support a Parole Hearing for 
Juveniles After Twenty-Five Years in All Cases
Though public policy is struggling to keep pace with developments in brain 
science,188 it is well established that the “relationship between aging and 
criminal activity has been noted since the beginnings of criminology.”189 In 
addition, the Court’s juvenile sentencing jurisprudence rests “not only on
common sense . . . but on science and social science as well.”190 Given its 
attentiveness to the developing field of brain science in guiding its jurisprudence 
at the time of sentencing, the Court should also consider empirical evidence of 
criminality in determining the maximum period of incarceration for juveniles 
before the Eighth Amendment mandates an opportunity for parole.191 Though 
                                                                                                                     
186 See OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GENERAL: U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, THE IMPACT OF AN 
AGING POPULATION ON THE FEDERAL BUREAU OF PRISONS 1–2 (2016) (finding “aging 
inmates cost 8% more per inmate to incarcerate”).
187 Johnson et al., supra note 96, at 220. In utilizing brain science research, the ultimate 
goal should be to formulate policies that “help to reinforce and perpetuate opportunities for 
adolescents to thrive in this stage of development, not just survive.” Id. A proactive approach 
to research and the attentiveness of policymakers are important next steps. Id.
188 Id. Policy mechanisms have not kept pace with the implications of neuroscientific 
research and policy developments tend to be reactive. Id.
189 Jeffery T. Ulmer & Darrell Steffensmeier, The Age and Crime Relationship: Social 
Variation, Social Explanations, in THE NURTURE VERSUS BIOSOCIAL DEBATE IN 
CRIMINOLOGY 377 (Kevin M. Beaver et al. eds., 2015). 
190 Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460, 471 (2012) (citing Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 
551, 569 (2005)). Roper notes “[o]nly a relatively small proportion of adolescents who 
experiment in risky or illegal activities develop entrenched patterns of problem behavior that 
persist into adulthood.” Roper, 543 U.S. at 570 (internal citations omitted). The holding in 
Graham was grounded in the finding that “developments in psychology and brain science 
continue to show fundamental differences between juvenile and adult minds. For example, 
[in] parts of the brain involved in behavior control continue to mature through late 
adolescence.” Graham, 560 U.S. at 68 (internal citation omitted).
191 See Bonnie & Scott, supra note 179 (describing the emerging importance of brain 
science on the Supreme Court’s juvenile justice jurisprudence); see also Diatchenko v. Dist. 
Attorney for Suffolk Dist., 1 N.E.3d 270, 283–84 (Mass. 2013). The Massachusetts Supreme 
Court succinctly describes the most prudent Constitutional reaction to advancements in brain 
science stating: 
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the overall impact of brain development on juvenile sentencing remains 
incomplete,192 the Court should look to empirical evidence of declining crime 
rates as people age to mandate a parole hearing after twenty-five years.193 The 
vast literature of developmental criminology supports this policy, as younger 
age is a risk factor for ongoing violent behavior, while the risk of recidivism 
decreases with older age.194
A growing body of scientific evidence supports the reexamination of life-
without-parole sentences for juveniles. For example, Dr. Leah H. Somerville’s
research focuses on the changes of the maturing brain and its effects on how 
people think.195 In Dr. Somerville’s research, adolescents performed at levels 
comparable to adults on cognition tests under controlled conditions.196
However, when under pressure, adolescent scores plummeted relative to their 
adult counterparts, suggesting a diminished ability to replicate their normal 
decision-making process while under emotional distress.197 The implications of 
this research should be a particularly strong consideration when a juvenile’s
misdeed is preceded by emotional trauma or is made under the influence of 
                                                                                                                     
Given current scientific research on adolescent brain development, and the myriad 
significant ways that this development impacts a juvenile’s personality and behavior, a 
conclusive showing of traits such as an ‘irretrievably depraved character,’ can never be 
made, with integrity, by the Commonwealth at an individualized hearing to determine 
whether a sentence of life without parole should be imposed on a juvenile homicide 
offender. Simply put, because the brain of a juvenile is not fully developed, either 
structurally or functionally, by the age of eighteen, a judge cannot find with confidence 
that a particular offender, at that point in time, is irretrievably depraved.
Id. (internal citations omitted).
192 See Bonnie & Scott, supra note 179, at 161 (“Currently, the only legitimate use of 
adolescent brain research in individual cases is to provide decision makers with general 
descriptions of brain maturation.”). 
193 See NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, UNDERSTANDING AND PREVENTING VIOLENCE,
VOLUME 3: SOCIAL INFLUENCES 18 (Albert J. Reiss & Jeffrey A. Roth eds., 1994) (finding 
“[a]ge is one of the major individual-level of correlates of violent offending . . . arrests for 
violent crime peak around age 18 and decline gradually thereafter”) (internal citations 
omitted); see also John Monahan et al., Age, Risk Assessment, & Sanctioning: 
Overestimating the Old, Underestimating the Young, 41 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 192 (2017)
(“That older people commit crime, particularly violent crime, at lower rates than younger 
people is a staple in criminology and has been known for as long as official records have 
been kept.”). 
194 Middle-aged people (from twenty-six to forty years old) were significantly less likely 
to reoffend than their younger counterparts, with the risk of recidivism decreasing beyond 
forty years of age. Id. at 200. This data matches the conclusion of brain scientists who have 
documented evidence of brain maturation well into the twenties. See Johnson et al., supra 
note 96, at 1.
195 Carl Zimmer, You’re an Adult. Your Brain, Not So Much, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 21, 
2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/12/21/science/youre-an-adult-your-brain-not-so-
much.html [on file with Ohio State Law Journal].
196 Id.
197 Id.
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drugs or alcohol. When considered in tandem with the Court’s jurisprudence, 
juvenile brain science research supports the assertion that juveniles are less 
culpable than adults, are capable of rehabilitation, and need not be incapacitated 
for the rest of their lives for the sake of public safety.
VI. CONCLUSION
Today, Henry Montgomery is a gentle, soft-spoken inmate in his early 70s 
at Angola State Penitentiary.198 His institutional record is nearly spotless, and 
he has developed trade skills, mentored other inmates, and participated in 
programming options, even those not designed for his rehabilitative 
objectives.199 On the outside, Montgomery’s hometown of Scotlandville is now 
formally a part of Baton Rouge,200 and the term “super-predator” has been 
rejected as a racist term by the leaders of every major national political
movement.201 Though he was denied release after the Supreme Court’s ruling in 
his favor, Montgomery retains a positive attitude and hopes to get a second 
chance from the Louisiana Parole Board at his next hearing.202 Unfortunately, 
thousands of other juveniles are left without the glimmer of hope that Henry 
Montgomery has sustained, even when “the law said he was going to die in 
prison.”203
Though the Supreme Court is reluctant to adopt bright-line rules that 
constrain the sentencing options of the states, the Court must act to protect the 
rights of juveniles if they are to receive any Eighth Amendment protection 
across the country. The Court has already categorically banned capital 
punishment for juveniles in a case that also gave rise to its jurisprudence in 
Graham, Miller, and Montgomery.204 The disparate reaction of the states to 
Supreme Court jurisprudence has created a messy hodgepodge that threatens the 
very application of the Eighth Amendment to juvenile sentences.205 It’s time the 
Supreme Court provides guidance that outlaws juvenile life without parole and 
standardizes parole eligibility at twenty-five years after sentencing. Doing so 
                                                                                                                     
198 Reckdahl, supra note 1; Toohey, supra note 1.
199 Reckdahl, supra note 1; Toohey, supra note 1.
200 Reckdahl, supra note 1.
201 Hillary Clinton was roundly criticized for using the term during the 2016 presidential 
election. Notwithstanding his own racist proclamations, the 45th President called her a 
“bigot” and Reince Priebus reminded voters of her use of “super-predator” in defense of his 
statement. On the left, Bernie Sanders called the term “racist” and Clinton apologized for her 
word choice and expressed regret for her advocacy for the underlying policy choices. Allison 
Graves, Did Hillary Clinton Call African-American Youth “Superpredators?”, POLITIFACT 
(Aug. 18, 2016), http://www.politifact.com/truth-o-meter/statements/2016/aug/28/reince-
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will breathe life into the Court’s rulings in Graham, Miller, and Montgomery
and provide new hope for kids long denied an opportunity for redemption.

